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The fragmented state of contemporary international law and 
institutions gives rise to contentious relationships between larger 
policy objectives. An example of such relationships—the ―trade and 
health‖ debate—has long been understood as suffering from a lack of 
policy coherence, at the expense of health. This Article explores the 
institutional modalities of formulating a coherent policy that would 
redress the gravitational pull of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), examining opportunities for cooperation between the major 
relevant international organizations. Part II of the Article notes the 
multi-layered impacts of trade on health, mindful of areas of tension 
between trade agreements and health. Then, in Part III, these 
tensions are placed within the broader discourse about the 
fragmentation of international law into sectoral normative regimes, 
with a view to highlighting the major risks involved in the process. 
Part IV briefly addresses the impact of trade agreements on national 
health measures and the operation of the ―health exception‖ in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 in light of the 
jurisprudence of WTO tribunals. Part V explores the role of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) in the governance of trade and 
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health. The Article concludes by making suggestions for formal inter-
institutional cooperation between the WTO and the WHO, which, it is 
hoped, would positively contribute to the development of norms and 
institutional practices that better integrate legitimate health 
objectives into trade policy making and implementation, and 
legitimate trade objectives into health policy making and 
implementation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2009, the Lancet, one of the world‘s leading health 
journals, published a six-part series on trade and health. The series 
introduction noted that ―trade directly and indirectly affects the health 
of the global population with an unrivalled reach and depth . . . .‖1 It 
argued that trade is a ―key health issue that the global-health 
community can no longer ignore‖2 and called on health professionals 
―to become engaged in the fight for a fairer trading system so that 
health has a chance of being considered as important as wealth.‖3 The 
publication and framing of the series by the Lancet reflect a concern 
among leading members of the global health community that the 
links between trade and health are not well enough understood—let 
alone addressed—within the field. The perception is of a lack of 
―policy coherence‖ between trade and health, at the expense of 
health. 
Such concerns about policy incoherence between trade and health 
are best analysed within a wider context. They form part of a much 
larger discourse about the fragmentation of international law and of 
the practice of international institutions. Concerns about trade and 
health reflect two specific manifestations of this broader discourse: 
perceptions of a crisis in global health governance; and the so-called 
―trade and ———‖ debates, which involve an examination of the 
links—and possible conflicts—between trade objectives and those of 
a range of other areas of domestic and international activity, 
including the environment, human rights, conditions of labour, and 
culture.4 These ―trade and ———‖ debates raise major questions 
 
1.  Rhona MacDonald & Richard Horton, Trade and Health: Time for the 
Health Sector to Get Involved, 373 LANCET 273, 273 (2009). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 274. 
4.  Jeffery Atik, Health, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW 597–98 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009) (―To a certain degree, the WTO-
and-health debates mirror anxieties about the compatibility of environmental, 
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about the power of the World Trade Organization (WTO), its 
sensitivity to other important (nontrade) values, and its role and 
influence in the governance of both international and domestic 
affairs. 
Building on the existing literature on the tensions between trade 
and health and aiming at contributing to suggestions for better 
managing them, this Article argues for inter-institutional cooperation 
processes that would maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of 
fragmentation. Part II notes the broad, multi-layered impacts of trade 
on health and areas of tension between trade agreements and health, 
focusing on public health measures designed to prevent 
noncommunicable diseases. Part III places these tensions within the 
broader context of fragmentation generally and the more specific 
context of fragmentation of global health governance and seeks to 
identify some of the major risks of fragmentation. Part IV briefly 
sketches the treatment of health in several WTO Agreements, 
including the health exception in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade5 (GATT) 1994 and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services6 (GATS) and explains the problem of ―regulatory chill,‖ 
which is caused by uncertainty about the impact of these trade 
agreements. Part V explores the role of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in the governance of trade and health and 
makes some suggestions for formal inter-institutional cooperation 
between the WTO and the WHO. It argues that such cooperation 
should ultimately lead to the development of norms and institutional 
practices that better integrate legitimate health objectives into trade 
policy making and implementation and legitimate trade objectives 
into health policy making and implementation. The benefits of such 
integration would be seen in improvements in both global health and 
global economic development.7 
 
labour and human rights protections with WTO norms.‖). 
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994) 
[hereinafter GATT].  
6. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].  
7. For discussion of the links between health and development, see World 
Health Organization [WHO], Investing in Health: A Summary of the Findings of 
the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, available at http://www.who.int/ 
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II. THE IMPACT OF TRADE AND TRADE AGREEMENTS ON HEALTH 
A. The Impacts of Trade on Health 
Cross-disciplinary, international work conducted over the last 
decade has illustrated the many ways in which people‘s health is 
determined by their social conditions. In 2005, the WHO established 
a Commission on Social Determinants of Health, which published in 
2008 its final report, Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity 
Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health.8 The 
Commission concluded that ―the high burden of illness responsible 
for appalling premature loss of life arises in large part because of the 
conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work, and age—
conditions that together provide the freedom people need to live lives 
they value.‖9 Conditions that negatively impact on health include lack 
of income, economic insecurity, inappropriate housing, unsafe 
workplaces, and lack of access to health care.10  
If health is determined by such a broad range of social conditions, 
trade must affect health in multiple ways and on multiple levels, both 
―direct‖ and ―indirect.‖ Direct links between trade and health include 
damage caused by trade in harmful goods (such as goods 
contaminated by pathogens and goods containing dangerous 
substances) and the effects of liberalising trade in health-related 
services.11 Indirect links between trade and health include trade‘s 
influence on employment levels and income through its effects on 
macroeconomic conditions.12 As Anna Shea, Nancy Ross, and Jody 
Heymann observe, the fact that poverty and inequality exert negative 
effects on people‘s health means that understanding how trade 
policies affect health requires an analysis of their impacts on poverty 
 
macrohealth/infocentre/advocacy/en/investinginhealth02052003.pdf. See also R 
Dodd & A. Cassels, Health, Development and the Millennium Development Goals, 
100 ANNALS TROPICAL MED. & PARASITOLOGY 379 (2006). 
8. See WHO, Comm‘n on Soc. Determinants of Health, Closing the Gap in a 
Generation: Health Equality Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health 
(2008) [hereinafter WHO, CSDH Final Report], available at http://whqlibdoc.who. 
int/publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf. 
9. Id. at 26 (citation omitted). 
10. Ronald Labonte, Ted Schrecker & David Sanders, Trade Policy and Health 
Equity: Can They Avoid a Collision?, in TRADE AND HEALTH: SEEKING COMMON 
GROUND 226, 226 (Chantal Blouin, Jody Heymann & Nick Drager eds., 2007). 
11. David P. Fidler, Nick Drager & Kelley Lee, Managing the Pursuit of Health 
and Wealth: The Key Challenges 373 LANCET 325, 328–29 (2009). 
12. Id. at 329. 
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and equality.13 
At the macro level, theory suggests that trade should improve 
people‘s health by enhancing the capacity of societies to produce 
goods and services, in turn increasing the capacity of governments to 
adjust to change, protect their interests, and invest in people‘s well-
being.14 David Fidler suggests that: 
Trade could even be considered a geopolitical determinant of 
health that requires the support and backing of public health as 
a matter of foreign policy. A weak or failing international 
trading system would produce political and economic 
consequences under which national and global health, 
especially of the most vulnerable populations, would suffer.15  
In contrast, a ―stable, orderly, and dynamic international trading 
system . . . delivers economic opportunities and resources that are 
critical for improving standards of living, funding public services, 
and supporting good governance.‖16 
The economic development impact of globalization in general and 
trade liberalization in particular has been widely studied. Not 
surprisingly, the empirical realities are complex and often contested. 
Shea, Ross, and Heymann argue that the best evidence offered by 
cross-national studies ―demonstrates that economic globalization‘s 
effects have been highly variable across populations and outcomes.‖17 
So too with trade liberalisation. It is widely accepted that trade 
liberalization alone is insufficient to boost economies.18 In several 
countries, it has not translated into economic expansion.19 
Complementary measures that create a stable macroeconomic 
environment, competitive exchange rate, solid fiscal policies, well-
functioning agricultural and labour markets, and physical 
 
 13. Anna Shea, Nancy Ross, & Jody Heymann, Trade, Inequalities, and Health: 
Making the Important Measurable, in TRADE AND HEALTH: SEEKING COMMON 
GROUND 202, 207 (Chantal Blouin, Jody Heymann, & Nick Drager eds., 2007).  
14. Id. at 203. 
15. David P. Fidler, Achieving Coherence in Anarchy: Foreign Policy, Trade 
and Health, in TRADE AND HEALTH: SEEKING COMMON GROUND 294, 311 (Chantal 
Blouin, Jody Heymann & Nick Drager eds., 2007). 
16. Id. 
17. Shea, Ross & Heymann, supra note 13, at 212. 
18. Chantal Blouin, Mickey Chopra & Rolph van der Hoeven, Trade and Social 
Determinants of Health, 373 LANCET 502, 503 (2009). 
19. Id. 
MITCHELL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  1:45 PM 
148 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:143 
infrastructure are needed to ensure that trade openness leads to a high 
level of growth.20  
With respect to people‘s health, as Shea, Ross, and Heymann 
highlight, the distribution of wealth within a society is critical—it is 
levels of poverty and inequality that matter most.21 The ―social 
gradient‖ in health affects people in rich and poor countries alike, 
with low socioeconomic status in all countries being related to poor 
education, lack of amenities, unemployment and job insecurity, poor 
working conditions, and unsafe neighbourhoods.22 These outcomes 
are not necessarily improved when a nation‘s trade regime is 
liberalised,23 especially where trade liberalization is not accompanied 
by governance reforms. The authors highlight ―suggestive cross-
national and national evidence showing that increased trade can lead 
to worsened levels of poverty, inequality, and by extension, well-
being.‖24 In every society, trade reforms create winners and losers.25 
B. The Impact of Trade Agreements on Governments‘ Capacity 
to Promote and Protect Health 
The negotiation and adoption of trade agreements (be they 
multilateral, plurilateral, or bilateral) have been at the heart of the 
rapid process of liberalisation that has unfolded over the last fifty 
years. The adoption of these agreements has seen the elimination or 
reduction of a wide range of barriers to trade, both tariffs and 
―nontariff barriers to trade,‖ which include trade-discriminatory laws, 
policies, and programmes. New goods and services have flooded into 
markets all over the world. Multinational corporations have expanded 
their operations, entering markets that had previously been closed to 
them. The effects on economies and cultures have been 
 
20. Id. See also John H. Jackson, International Economic Law: Complexity and 
Puzzles 10 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 3, 8 (2007) (―While liberal trade policies have been 
important enhancers of citizen welfare in some countries, it is becoming clearer that 
such trade policies alone will most often not have a welfare enhancing effect.‖). 
Jackson lists a number of factors which can prevent economic progress, including 
lack of peace and security, lack of market infrastructure, bad governance, health, 
education, skills, attitudes, lack of human rights and societal stress due to large 
inequalities of economic status. Id. at 8–9.  
21. Shea, Ross & Heymann, supra note 13, at 219.  
22. WHO, CSDH Final Report, supra note 8, at 31. 
23. Shea, Ross & Heymann, supra note 13, at 219–20.  
24. Id. at 220. 
25. Blouin, Chopra & van der Hoeven, supra note 18, at 503. See also Shea, 
Ross & Heymann, supra note 13, at 220. 
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extraordinary. 
Within the large field of study and debate about trade and health, 
one area that has received considerable attention, both in academic 
literature and domestic and international political fora, has been the 
effects of trade agreements on governments‘ prerogative to freely 
choose and develop their political, social, and cultural systems, in 
particular their capacity to implement laws, policies, and programmes 
to promote and protect public health. Concerns that governments 
have ceded too much sovereignty in striking such agreements have 
been expressed.26 Albeit at times somewhat exaggerated, the 
discourse also points to the ―democratic deficit‖ in the WTO, which 
undermines the capacity of the organization to represent the will of 
the citizens of its members.27 The Lancet series includes articles on 
two of the most contentious areas: the impact of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)28 on 
access to medicines29 and of the GATS on the provision of health 
services.30  
Another area of significant academic and political discussion has 
been the impact of trade agreements on global efforts to reduce the 
burden of noncommunicable diseases.31 This is an area likely to gain 
 
26. Fons Coomans, Sovereignty Fading Away? Prioritizing Domestic Health 
Needs Versus Promoting Free Trade, in CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CEES FLINTERMAN 123, 125–26 
(Ineke Boerefijn & Jenny E. Goldsmith eds., 2009). 
27. Andrew D. Mitchell & Elizabeth Sheargold, Global Governance: The World 
Trade Organization‘s Contribution, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 1061, 1075–76 (2009). 
28. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].  
29. See Richard D. Smith, Carlos Correa & Cecilia Oh, Trade, TRIPS, and 
Pharmaceuticals, 373 LANCET 684 (2009). 
30. See Richard D. Smith, Rupa Chanda & Viroj Tangcharoensathien, Trade in 
Health-Related Services, 373 LANCET 593 (2009). 
31. See, e.g., Benn McGrady, Trade and Tobacco Control: Resolving Policy 
Conflicts Through Impact Assessment and Administrative Type International Laws, 
3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT‘L HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 341 (2008) [hereinafter McGrady, 
Trade and Tobacco Control]; Benn McGrady, Trade Liberalisation and Tobacco 
Control: Moving from a Policy of Exclusion Towards a More Comprehensive 
Policy, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 280 (2007) [hereinafter McGrady, Trade 
Liberalisation and Tobacco Control]; Allyn L. Taylor et al., The Impact of Trade 
Liberalization on Tobacco Consumption, in TOBACCO CONTROL IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 343 (Prabhat Jha & Frank Chaloupka eds., 2000); Cynthia Callard, 
Hatai Chitanondh & Robert Weissman, Why Trade and Investment Liberalisation 
May Threaten Effective Tobacco Control Efforts, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 68 
MITCHELL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  1:45 PM 
150 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:143 
in prominence over the coming years, with increasing recognition of 
the scale of the burden and understanding of its causes and 
momentum building internationally for concerted action to reduce it. 
In 2008, the World Health Assembly (WHA) endorsed the 2008–
2013 Action Plan for the Global Strategy for the Prevention and 
Control of Noncommunicable Diseases (Action Plan).32 The Action 
Plan records that noncommunicable diseases—principally 
cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancers, and chronic respiratory 
diseases—caused an estimated thirty-five million deaths in 2005.33 
This constituted sixty percent of all deaths globally, with eighty 
percent of these occurring in low- and middle-income countries.34 
Projections show that the total deaths from noncommunicable 
diseases will rise by seventeen percent over the next ten years, 
disproportionately affecting poor and disadvantaged populations and 
 
(2001); Douglas Bettcher & Ira Shapiro, Tobacco Control in an Area of Trade 
Liberalisation, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 65 (2001); Donald W. Zeigler, International 
Trade Agreements Challenge Tobacco and Alcohol Control Policies, 25 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL REV. 567 (2006), available at EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier, 
AN 23243788; Robin Room, International Control of Alcohol: Alternative Paths 
Forward, 25 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 581 (2006), available at EBSCOhost 
Academic Search Premier, AN 23243792; Ben Baumberg & Peter Anderson, Trade 
and Health: How World Trade Organization (WTO) Law Affects Alcohol and 
Public Health, 103 ADDICTION 1952 (2008), available at EBSCOhost Academic 
Search Premier, AN 35118782; Roger S. Magnusson, Non-communicable Diseases 
and Global Health Governance: Enhancing Global Processes to Improve Health 
Development, 3 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 2 (2007) [hereinafter Magnusson, 
Non-communicable Diseases and Global Health Governance] (on obesity), 
available at http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/2; Roger S. 
Magnusson, Rethinking Global Health Challenges: Towards a ‗Global Compact‘ 
for Reducing the Burden of Chronic Disease, 123 PUB. HEALTH 265 (2009) 
[hereinafter Magnusson, Rethinking Global Health Challenges] (same), available 
at EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier, AN 38507776; Blouin, Chopra & van 
der Hoeven, supra note 18 (same); Anne Marie Thow and Corinna Hawkes, The 
Implications of Trade Liberalization for Diet and Health: A Case Study from 
Central America, 5 GLOBAL HEALTH 5 (2009), available at http://www.globalzatio 
nandhealth.com/content/5/1/5. 
32. World Health Assembly [WHA], Sixty-first Assem., Geneva, Switz., May 
19–24, 2008, Summary Records of Committees–Reports of Committees—Resolution 
of the 61st World Health Assembly–Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable 
Diseases: Implementation of the Global Strategy, WHA61.14, WHA61/2008/REC/ 
3 (May 24, 2008), available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA61-
REC1/A61_REC1-en.pdf. 
33. WHO, 2008-2013 Action Plan for the Global Strategy for the Prevention 
and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, at 9 (2008) [hereinafter Action Plan], 
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241597418_eng.pdf. 
34. Id. 
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contributing to widening health gaps between and within countries.35 
Noncommunicable diseases are thus ―closely linked to global social 
and economic development.‖36 Tackling the growing burden 
―constitutes one of the major challenges for development in the 
twenty-first century.‖37 
As the Action Plan makes clear, noncommunicable diseases are 
largely preventable. Key to their prevention is reducing the level of 
exposure of individuals and populations to their four common risk 
factors—tobacco use, unhealthy diet, physical inactivity, and harmful 
use of alcohol.38 Roger Magnusson argues that consumption of 
tobacco and overconsumption of alcohol and unhealthy foods (foods 
high in fat, salt, and/or sugar) reflect ―the success of global business 
enterprises that seek to manipulate consumer behaviour for profit and 
to resist measures that could reduce consumption.‖39 Regulating the 
behaviour of these entities is an essential part of comprehensive 
prevention programmes and is bound to generate debate about 
consistency with international trade obligations.  
III. FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
A. The Causes of Fragmentation 
As noted in Part I, concerns about incoherence between trade and 
health are best viewed within the wider context of concern about the 
fragmentation of international law and of the practice of international 
institutions. In the Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Martti Koskenniemi explains that, while 
globalisation ―has led to increasing uniformization of social life 
around the world, it has also led to its increasing fragmentation—that 
is, to the emergence of specialized and relatively autonomous spheres 
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 13. 
37. Id. at 9. 
38. Id. at 10. 
39. Magnusson, Rethinking Global Health Challenges, supra note 31, at 268. 
See also Fidler, supra note 15, at 321; Derek Yach & Robert Beaglehole, 
Globalization of Risks for Chronic Diseases Demands Global Solutions, 3 
CHRONIC DISEASES & GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 213, 220 (2004), available at 
EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier, AN 14578875. 
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of social action and structure.‖40 This ―fragmentation of the 
international social world has attained legal significance especially as 
it has been accompanied by the emergence of specialized and 
(relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions 
and spheres of legal practice.‖41  
A number of factors have been identified as contributing to the 
―fractious state of the international legal system,‖42 including: the 
proliferation of norm-creating and norm-influencing international 
institutions or expansion of the mandate of existing ones; the 
increased emphasis on and prominence of regionalization; 
technology-driven global changes giving rise to new areas of 
regulation; global environmental challenges; the greater prominence 
of and recognition of individual rights, internationally, regionally, 
and nationally;43 the lack of centralized organs; the specialization of 
regulations; and the different structures of legal norms.44 
Fragmentation, however, ―is not necessarily a bad thing.‖45 
Specialization in law making and law enforcement can lead to better 
law.46 Competition between institutions can increase efficiency and 
provide opportunities for the development of new legal instruments.47 
New forms of cooperation among intergovernmental bodies with 
different institutional strengths can be generated, and new venues in 
which states can bargain and link issue areas can be created.48 
Analysis of complex problems from different perspectives and from 
 
40. Int‘l Law Comm‘n, Fifty-eighth Sess., Geneva, Switz., May 1–9 & July 3–
Aug. 11, 2006, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law— Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission, para. 7, U.N. DOC, A/CONF.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 
2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter Int‘l Law Comm‘n Report], 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/1_9.htm. 
41. Id. para. 8 (citation omitted). 
42. Victor Mosoti, Institutional Cooperation and Norm Creation in 
International Organizations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 165, 
167 (Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi eds., 2005). 
43. Id. 
44.  Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of 
International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 849, 854–55 (2004). 
45. Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a 
Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 903, 904 (2004). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New 
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 
82 (2004). 
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within different professional, political, and institutional cultures can 
facilitate creative thinking and allow for the development and 
implementation of innovative approaches. 
B. Fragmentation in Global Health Governance 
In the public health field, scholars have become increasingly 
concerned about the fragmented nature of global health governance. 
Pronounced fragmentation in this field is perhaps inevitable given the 
breadth of the determinants of health. For example, ―[p]olicies 
outside the health sector, in areas such as trade, the environment, and 
education, are becoming drivers of health and health risks.‖49 Thus, 
―[h]ealth problems are no longer ‗only‘ health problems and are no 
longer the domain of ‗only‘ health officials.‖50 Writing about 
noncommunicable diseases, Magnusson points out that ―[e]ffective 
regulation of the structural and environmental determinants requires 
interventions that extend well beyond the health sector‖51 with policy 
influence required in areas such as agriculture, finance and taxation, 
education, recreation and sports, media and communication, 
transportation, and urban planning.52 
In health, as in other areas of policy, fragmentation in governance 
at the domestic level feeds upwards to the international level. Thomas 
Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn, and Elisabeth Bürgi argue that the problem 
of coordination: 
starts with the lack of adequate domestic policy coordination 
within governments. Problems faced on the international level 
between international organizations often merely reflect the 
fact that governments are equally fragmented . . . . Ministries 
and departments are competing in the pursuit of their policy 
briefs, and supported by different constituencies in society.53 
At the international level, Allyn Taylor identifies the ―diversity of 
 
49. Diana Chigas et al., Negotiating Across Boundaries: Promoting Health in a 
Globalized World, in TRADE AND HEALTH: SEEKING COMMON GROUND 325, 326 
(Chantal Blouin, Jody Heymann & Nick Drager eds., 2007). 
50. Id. 
51. Magnusson, Non-communicable Diseases and Global Health Governance, 
supra note 31, at 3 (citation omitted). 
52. Id. at 3–4 (citation omitted). 
53. THOMAS COTTIER, JOOST PAUWELYN, & ELISABETH BÜRGI, Linking Trade 
Regulation and Human Rights in International Law: An Overview, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 10 (2005).  
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intergovernmental organizations [that] now contribute to the 
elaboration of the increasingly complex and multivaried field of 
international health law,‖54 including the WHO, the United Nations 
Children‘s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World 
Bank, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Commission for 
Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council), and the WTO.55 
Lawrence Gostin and Allyn Taylor note the ―growing evidence of 
fragmentation, duplication and inconsistency in areas of global health 
law-making . . . [and that] [t]he proliferation of actors and institutions 
[in] the field of global health law is not serving to strengthen global 
health governance, but rather is leaving the field in disarray.‖56 
Importantly, as Fidler, Drager, and Lee observe, fragmentation is 
challenging the ―WHO‘s lead role as the UN specialised agency for 
health.‖57 
Fragmentation at the international level is not, of course, simply a 
product of domestic fragmentation—it also reinforces it. For 
example, Fidler describes the process of ―transgovernmentalism,‖ 
under which ―stove-piped‖ government ministries and agencies, 
increasingly having to manage globalized issues, begin to interact 
more directly with their counterparts in ministries overseas, often 
without the benefit of domestic interagency processes.58 This 
complicates the process of domestic policy development and defies 
standards of good governance requiring transparency and 
 
54. Allyn L. Taylor, Governing the Globalization of Public Health, 32 J. L. 
MED. & ETHICS 500, 502–03 (2004) (citation omitted). 
55. Id. at 503. Other international organizations that could be added to Taylor‘s 
list include the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). This combined list remains far from complete, indicating the 
range of areas of policy that impact either directly or indirectly on health. 
56. Lawrence O. Gostin & Allyn L. Taylor, Global Health Law: A Definition 
and Grand Challenges, 1 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 53, 60 (2008). See also Magnusson, 
Rethinking Global Health Challenges, supra note 31, at 266–67; Lawrence O. 
Gostin, A Proposal for a Framework Convention on Global Health, 10 J. INT‘L 
ECON. L. 989, 990–91 (2007). 
57. Fidler, Drager & Lee, supra note 11, at 327. 
58. Fidler, supra note 15, at 299. 
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legitimacy.59 Such ―[h]orizontal policy plumbing among finance 
ministries of various countries might achieve coherence among 
themselves but to the exclusion of connecting their pipes with the 
plumbing running to the development or environment ministries.‖60 
Thus the search for coherence is a search for coherence at two 
levels—―external policy coherence‖ (which involves the balancing of 
the health and trade interests of different states) and ―internal policy 
coherence‖ (which involves getting trade and health policy makers to 
work together more effectively in formulating the national interest).61 
However, the challenges of finding coherence at the domestic and 
international levels are fundamentally different. As David Leebron 
points out, ―in the domestic context there is virtually always some 
coordinating mechanism and superior authority (such as the chief 
executive) to coordinate both the allocation of tasks and the 
substantive resolution of issues.‖62 In contrast, ―[a]lthough various 
international organizations have mechanisms for cooperating with 
each other, these relationships are generally neither hierarchical nor 
comprehensive.‖63  
C. The Risks of Fragmentation 
As noted above, fragmentation is not, in itself, a good thing or a 
bad thing. Rather, it is a fact of political and legal life with both 
positive and negative features. The governance challenge is to 
maximize the opportunities that it offers and minimize its harms.  
In order to do so, it is necessary to be mindful of the major risks 
that it creates. At the international level, these include the 
development of potentially conflicting norms by different institutions, 
creating either the impossibility of complying with both sets of norms 
or significant uncertainty about how states, institutions, and their 
individual representatives should behave;64 the development of 
conflicting institutional practices (including in programs that seek to 
implement or facilitate the implementation of norms);65 the failure of 
 
59. Mitchell & Sheargold, supra note 27, at 1064. 
60. Fidler, supra note 15, at 300. 
61. See id. at 299, 306. 
62. David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 5, 8 (2002). 
63. Id. See also Fidler, supra note 15, at 314; Hafner, supra note 44, at 854. 
64. See Int‘l Law Comm‘n Report, supra note 40, para. 14; Mosoti, supra note 
42, at 168. 
65. Int‘l Law Comm‘n Report, supra note 40, para. 14. 
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institutions to learn from and make use of the expertise of other 
institutions, diminishing the quality of their work;66 inter-institutional 
tensions and turf wars;67 and inefficient duplication of activities of 
different institutions.68 
IV. THE GOVERNANCE OF HEALTH THROUGH THE WTO 
AGREEMENTS 
A. Trade‘s Perceived Dominance 
The ―battle‖ between trade and health values and governance 
arrangements is played out on many different levels and in many 
different fora. At the domestic level, it can be observed in the 
development and implementation of both trade and health policy, in 
the development of government trade negotiation positions, and in 
the implementation of obligations under trade agreements. At the 
international level, it is acted out in the negotiation of trade 
agreements by states—whether multilateral, plurilateral, or 
bilateral—and in the oversight of implementation by the parties to 
these agreements, including the various formal and informal 
exchanges they may have at different levels of government about 
their respective rights and obligations and levels of compliance. It is 
also played out—perhaps most prominently—through formal dispute 
settlement processes, such as under the WTO‘s Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures for the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).69  
Scholarship in the public health field tends to express a perception 
that health does poorly in its ―battles‖ with trade. In domestic 
settings, Fidler writes that ―trade ministries typically have more 
power within governments than health ministries . . . .‖70 This 
manifests itself particularly acutely in the setting of trade policy, in 
light of the ―low status that health policy receives compared with the 
status of commercial interests in the setting of trade policy.‖71 Public-
interest groups tend to exert less weight than industry lobbyists in 
 
66. Mosoti, supra note 42, at 173. 
67. Id. at 168. 
68. Id. 
69. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU]. 
70. Fidler, supra note 15, at 315. 
71. Kelley Lee, Devi Sridhar & Mayur Patel, Bridging the Divide: Global 
Governance of Trade and Health, 373 LANCET 416, 418 (2009). 
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setting priorities and shaping the international trade agenda.72 This 
absence of health representation in trade policy is particularly 
pronounced in low- and middle-income countries.73  
This imbalance at the domestic level both shapes and is fuelled by 
the international mechanisms for governing trade and health. Fidler, 
Drager, and Lee argue that comparing these mechanisms ―reveals 
why trade has so far dominated governance of this relationship.‖74 
They contrast global health governance, with its limited structural 
coherence, greater diversity of actors, and approaches and weaker 
legal obligations on states, with the ―highly structured, formalised, 
and demanding governance system‖ of international trade.75 In 
contrast to the WTO, membership in the WHO ―is not legally 
demanding on states,‖ and other international agreements directly 
affecting health have not contained extensive duties or detailed and 
specific requirements.76 The ―scope and demanding nature‖ of the 
WTO rules is reinforced through its compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism, under which trade sanctions may be applied.77 The 
WHO‘s two legally binding instruments—the International Health 
Regulations (IHR)78 and the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC)79—do not contain compulsory dispute 
settlement and enforcement provisions. They ―thus lack the 
compliance bite that WTO rules have. This difference could affect 
how seriously countries take obligations connected to the two 
organisations.‖80 Further, the proliferation of regional and bilateral 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Fidler, Drager & Lee, supra note 11, at 327. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 328. See also Gostin & Taylor, supra note 56, at 60. 
77. Fidler, Drager & Lee, supra note 11, at 328. See also Pauwelyn, supra note 
45, at 905. Article 22 of the DSU sets forth procedures aiming at inducing 
compliance with Dispute Settlement Body rulings and recommendations. DSU, 
supra note 69, art. 22. Article 23 establishes the compulsory character of the 
dispute settlement mechanism envisaged by the DSU. Id. art. 23. 
78. WHO, Fifty-eighth Sess., Geneva, Switz., May 16–25, 2005, Revision of the 
International Health Regulations, WHO Res. WHA58.3 (May 23, 2005) 
[hereinafter WHO IHR], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9 
789241580410_eng.pdf.  
79. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 
U.N.T.S. 166, 42 I.L.M. 518 [hereinafter WHO FCTC]. 
80. Fidler, Drager & Lee, supra note 11, at 328. See also Gostin & Taylor, 
supra note 56, at 60. 
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trade agreements,81 which create a complex web of obligations and 
dispute settlement mechanisms that are impossible to monitor at the 
global level and therefore to respond to in a systematic way, 
―reinforces international trade law‘s dominant governance role in the 
trade and health arena.‖82 
B. Balancing Trade and Health in the WTO Agreements 
Health does feature prominently in the WTO agreements. Article 
XX of GATT and Article XIV of GATS both contain exceptions that 
allow members to implement domestic measures that are ―necessary‖ 
to protect human health, as long as they are not applied ―in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where [the same83/like84] conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade . . . .‖85 The 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade86 (TBT Agreement) and 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures87 (SPS Agreement) both affirm the right of WTO members 
to take measures necessary for the protection of human health, while 
seeking to prevent the creation of unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade.  
For example, under the TBT Agreement, technical regulations are 
not to be ―more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.‖88 
Legitimate objectives explicitly include ―protection of human 
 
81. See generally BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 
COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009). The 
WTO contains a regional trade agreements database on its website. See also WTO, 
Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/regi 
on_e/region_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). 
82. Fidler, Drager & Lee, supra note 11, at 328. 
83. The words ―the same conditions‖ are used in the GATT. 
84. The words ―like conditions‖ are used in the GATS. 
85. GATT, supra note 5, art. XX; GATS, supra note 6, art. XIV. 
86. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Multilateral 
Trade Agreements on Trade in Goods, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 122 [hereinafter TBT 
Agreement]. 
87. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, Multilateral Trade Agreements on Trade in Goods, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 
[hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
88. TBT Agreement, supra note 86, art. 2.2. 
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health.‖89  
Aimed at responding to a number of perceived inadequacies in the 
GATT 1947 discipline of state discretion in their health policy,90 the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round produced the SPS Agreement, 
which deals with certain health measures.91 Art 2.1 of the SPS 
Agreement affirms the right of WTO members to take sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures92 necessary for the protection of human 
health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the 
Agreement. Measures should be applied ―only to the extent necessary 
to protect‖ health, be based on scientific principles, and not be 
maintained without sufficient evidence (except for the case of 
provisional measures, where there is insufficient scientific evidence, 
and provided certain conditions are met);93 ―not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between members where identical or 
similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and 
that of other members;‖94 and ―not be applied in a manner that would 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.‖95 SPS 
measures that conform to the SPS Agreement are presumed to be in 
compliance with the WTO Agreements.  
 
89. See, e.g., id. pmbl. (―Recognizing that no country should be prevented from 
taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention 
of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the 
requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are 
otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement; . . .‖). 
90. Atik identifies, as such, the inadequately deferential nature of the ‗necessity 
requirement‘ in Article XX(b) GATT, the inability of panels to address relevant 
scientific claims, the lack of harmonization between justified measures under 
Article XX(b), and the repercussions of the E.C.-U.S. dispute over the use of 
growth hormones in beef production. Atik, supra note 4, at 598–99.  
91. For health measures not falling within the ambit of the SPS Agreement, 
Article XX(b) of GATT remains the relevant provision. Id. at 599. 
92. These terms are defined in clause 1 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement. SPS 
Agreement, supra note 87, art. 2.1, annex.  
93. Id. art. 2.2, 5.7. 
94. Id. art. 2.3. 
95. Id. art. 2.3. See also SPS Agreement, supra note 88, pmbl. (―Reaffirming 
that no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the 
requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international 
trade‖).  
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Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement allows members to exclude 
inventions from patentability where the prevention of commercial 
exploitation is necessary to protect, inter alia, public health.96 Article 
8.1 contains a principle that members may ―adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health . . . , provided that such measures are 
consistent with the provisions of th[e] Agreement.‖97 The TRIPS 
Agreement does not contain a health exception as such, and the status 
of the principle and the requirement for consistency with the terms of 
the Agreement have been the subject of debate.98 In the context of 
disagreement about the effects of the Agreement on access to 
medicines, the WTO members adopted in 2001 the Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the Doha TRIPS and Public 
Health Declaration),99 which includes the following statements: 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not 
prevent members from taking measures to protect public 
health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the 
TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive 
of WTO members‘ right to protect public health . . . .100 
. . . . 
  In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement 
shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the 
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and 
principles.101 
 
96. TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27.2. 
97. Id. art. 8.1. 
98. See, e.g., Benn McGrady, TRIPS and Trademarks: The Case of Tobacco, 3 
WORLD TRADE REV. 53, 68 (2004). 
99. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002). See also 
Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs 
and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 571 
(2009). 
100. Id. para. 4. 
101. Id. para. 5(a). Coomans argues that the statement effectively waived TRIPS 
requirements that restricted production under compulsory licensing to the domestic 
market. Coomans, supra note 26, at 129. For a discussion of the circumstances of 
the negotiation and adoption of the Doha Declaration and of the legal status of the 
declaration, see, for example, James T. Gatthii, The Legal Status of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291 (2002); Ellen ‗t Hoen, TRIPS, 
Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from 
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However, the Doha TRIPS and Public Health Declaration appears 
in practice to be indirectly circumvented by ―TRIPS-plus‖ Free Trade 
Agreements, which provide higher levels of intellectual property 
protection than TRIPS and operate outside the context of the WTO.102 
Such agreements will likely exert a significant impact on the 
availability and accessibility of essential medicines, although it is still 
too early to confidently assume in this respect.103 
Returning to the multilateral context, while the value of health is 
recognized in all of these agreements, the aim in all cases is to strike 
a balance between trade and health objectives. The need for 
balance—rather than a hierarchy of importance—between trade and 
health is not uniquely a product of WTO processes. Indeed, it is also 
reflected in the WHO‘s International Health Regulations (IHR), the 
purpose and scope of which ―are to prevent, protect against, control 
and provide a public health response to the international spread of 
disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public 
health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with 
international traffic and trade.‖104  
While balance is an unimpeachable principle, difficulties of course 
arise when it has to be struck in a particular case. Uncertainty cannot 
be avoided. As for any subjective decision, the identity of the person 
or body charged with striking the balance and its sources of 
information are critical. Public health advocates have expressed 
concerns about the suitability of trade panels to weigh trade and 
health values.105 The understandable concern is that individuals who 
are expert in trade and likely to be internalized within trade cultures 
and ―epistemic communities‖ are likely to better understand and 
place a greater value upon trade values than health values. Baumberg 
and Anderson point out that the deciding of cases ―within opaque 
panels by experts on trade—although admittedly politically sensitive 
 
Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 27 (2002); Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. 
INT‘L ECON. L. 73, 81–83 (2004); Andrew D. Mitchell and Tania Voon, Patents 
and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in 
International Law, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 571, 578–79 (2009). 
102. Coomans, supra note 26, at 132. 
103. Id. at 136–41. 
104. WHO IHR, supra note 78, art. 2 (emphasis added). See also Fidler, supra 
note 15, at 307–08. 
105. See, e.g., Callard, Chitanondh & Weissman, supra note 31, at 69. 
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trade experts‖—can lead to ―a feeling that health views are 
marginalized.‖106 This concern is not confined to the ―trade and 
health‖ equation. For example, Andrew Guzman writes that the 
resolution of tensions in the relationship between trade and labour 
standards through the WTO‘s Appellate Body is undesirable because 
the Appellate Body is poorly positioned to completely understand the 
tradeoffs at stake.107 
In a strict legal sense, neither panels nor the Appellate Body are 
authorized to ―interpret‖ the WTO agreements; Art IX:2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(Marrakesh Agreement) reserves to the Ministerial Conference and 
the General Council the ―exclusive authority to adopt interpretations 
of the Marrakesh Agreements and the covered Multilateral 
Agreements.‖108 Furthermore, WTO tribunals and the DSU Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) cannot ―add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations [of members] provided in the covered agreements.‖109 In 
practice, however, ―panel and Appellate Body reports are 
interpreting, elaborating, and consolidating WTO law norms . . . .‖110 
Their decisions are pivotal to the way WTO obligations and rights are 
understood111 and contribute to greater predictability and security in 
the dispute settlement system.112 
C. The Health Exception in the GATT and the GATS 
The striking of the balance between trade and health values by 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body has occurred most prominently 
in their interpretation of the health exception (particularly the word 
―necessary‖) found in the GATT and the GATS. It is clear that health 
 
106. Baumberg & Anderson, supra note 31, at 1953. See also Ronald Labonte 
& Matthew Sanger, Glossary of the World Trade Organisation and Public Health: 
Part 2, 60 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 738, 743 (2006). 
107. Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 885, 887 
(2003). 
108. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 
IX(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 159, 33 I.L.M.1144, 1148 (1994) 
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
109. DSU, supra note 69, art. 3.2. 
110. Mosoti, supra note 42, at 176. 
111. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 11–13, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996); See also 
Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, 
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 247, 254 (2004). 
112. See Appellate Body Report, US–Final Anti-dumping Duties on Stainless 
Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008). 
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is treated as an important value in the language of WTO 
jurisprudence. In 2001, in European Communities—Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, the Appellate 
Body wrote that the ―preservation of human life and health . . . is 
both vital and important in the highest degree.‖113 But a recognition of 
the importance of health says little about how the balance with trade 
will be struck either in general or in any particular case.  
The jurisprudence on the health exception has evolved over the 
years, arguably towards an application of the health exception (and 
other exceptions) that is more accommodating of health (as well as 
other nontrade) interests than previously. Recent jurisprudence in 
particular suggests that governments retain a significant degree of 
policy space.114 The most recent major Appellate Body decision 
interpreting the necessity exception, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres,115 confirms that WTO members are 
entitled to set the public health objective they seek to achieve and the 
level of protection they want to obtain;116 the determination of 
necessity involves a ―weighing and balancing‖ exercise;117 the 
 
113. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, para. 172, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 
12, 2001). 
114. Of course, this is a matter of judgment, and throughout the evolution of the 
jurisprudence, different views have been expressed about the amount of policy 
space it leaves to governments. For the view that significant policy space is 
reserved, see, for example, Baumberg & Anderson, supra note 31, 1954–55; Alyssa 
Woo, Health Versus Trade: The Future of the WHO‘s Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, 35 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT‘L. L. 1731, 1763–64 (2002); Debra 
P. Steger, Afterword: The ―Trade and . . .‖ Conundrum – A Commentary, 96 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 135, 144 (2002); Yach & Beaglehole, supra note 39, at 222; Bettcher & 
Shapiro, supra note 1, 65–66. For the alternate view, see, for example, Zeigler 
supra note 31, at 575; Labonte & Sanger supra note 106; Callard, Chitanondh & 
Weissman, supra note 31, at 69. 
115. Appellate Body Report, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [Hereinafter Brazil–Retreaded Tyres AB 
Report]. The interpretation in Brazil–Retreaded Tyres is broadly consistent with, 
and builds on, previous cases, though it may include a stronger recognition of the 
importance of not treating complementary measures as alternatives. See also Benn 
McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory 
Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12(1) J. INT‘L ECON. L. 153, 163–
68 (2008). 
116. The ―right that WTO Members have to determine the level of protection 
they consider appropriate in a given context[]‖ is a ―fundamental principle.‖Brazil–
Retreaded Tyres AB Report, supra note 115, para. 210. 
117. In order to determine whether a measure is necessary, ―a panel must 
consider the relevant factors, particularly the importance of the interests or values 
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contribution made by a measure to the achievement of its objective 
must be material, not merely marginal or insignificant;118 the 
contribution made by a measure to the achievement of its objective 
can be demonstrated by either a qualitative or quantitative analysis;119 
certain complex public health problems can be ―tackled only with 
comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting 
measures‖;120 the results obtained from certain actions, including 
certain preventive actions to reduce the incidence of diseases that 
may manifest themselves only after a certain period of time, can only 
be evaluated with the benefit of time;121 if the weighing and balancing 
described above yields a preliminary conclusion that a measure is 
necessary,122 the result must be confirmed by comparing the measure 
with possible alternatives identified by the complaining member, 
which ―may be less trade restrictive while providing an equivalent 
contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued‖;123 a 
member whose measures have been challenged may seek to show 
that a suggested possible alternative was not in fact ―reasonably 
available‖;124 and mutually supportive elements of a comprehensive 
policy cannot be considered real alternatives.125  
While the interpretation does not strictly ―prioritize‖ health ―over‖ 
trade, it does appear to seek a reasonable balance, enabling 
governments‘ public health objectives to outweigh trade objectives 
where the former meet the requirements of the exception. The 
Appellate Body‘s interpretation also acknowledges the complexity 
 
at stake, the extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure‘s 
objective, and its trade restrictiveness.‖ Id. para. 178. 
118. Id. para. 210. 
119. Id. paras. 146–47, 151. 
120. Id. para. 151. In the short-term, it may be ―difficult to isolate the 
contribution . . . of one specific measure from those attributable to the other 
measures that are part of the same comprehensive policy.‖ Id. 
121. Id. (citation omitted). 
122. By allowing necessity to be ―provisionally‖ established, Atik notes that the 
Appellate Body in Brazil–Retreaded Tyres ―softened‖ the requirements of Article 
XX(b). Atik, supra note 4, at 614–15. 
123. Brazil–Retreaded Tyres AB Report, supra note 115, para. 156. 
124. For example, where the measure is merely theoretical in nature, ―for 
instance, where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the 
measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or 
substantial technical difficulties.‖ Id. (citing Appellate Body Report, United State –
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
para. 308, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005)). 
125. Id. paras. 181, 211. 
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and inter-relatedness of the multiple elements of comprehensive 
public health policy as well as the difficulties of precisely 
quantifying, particularly in advance and in the absence of direct 
precedent the likely effectiveness of measures sought to be 
implemented.126  
D. Uncertainty and Regulatory Chill 
Even if it is correct that panels and the Appellate Body leave 
governments significant room to undertake measures to protect public 
health (and other important values)—and will likely continue to do 
so—the very fact of justiciability and the inherent uncertainty of the 
judicial process contribute to what is commonly known as 
―regulatory chill‖—in this context, ―the reluctance of governments to 
introduce domestic public health laws for fear of inviting trade 
disputes.‖127 In the absence of cooperation of all major trade 
competitors, it is not difficult to imagine that this effect may spill 
onto the international level as well. This chill is likely to be 
particularly pronounced in areas where powerful commercial entities 
have an interest in dissuading governments from acting, such as in 
the area of noncommunicable disease prevention. Well-resourced 
companies regularly commission legal opinions from leading 
domestic and international lawyers that highlight—–and have an 
incentive to overstate—the risks of a successful trade challenge. Even 
the successful defence of a trade challenge takes significant time and 
resources, which governments may prefer to allocate elsewhere.  
 
126. To be sure, criticisms have been made of the jurisprudence. For example, 
Schoenbaum, over a decade ago, argued that the requirement that governments 
adopt the ―‗least trade restrictive‘‖ measure reasonably available ―turns the clause 
on its head,‖ with ―‗necessary‘‖ no longer relating to the objective but to the 
departure from the trade agreement. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade 
and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 
AM. J. INT‘L L. 268, 276 (1997). This interpretation ―constitutes too great an 
infringement on the sovereign powers of states to take decisions (one hopes) by 
democratic means so as to solve problems and satisfy their constituents.‖ Id. at 277 
(citation omitted). McGrady argues that ―[n]either the panel nor the Appellate Body 
has a legitimate role in evaluating the importance of domestic policy goals that fall 
within the scope of the provision.‖ McGrady, supra note 115, at 162 (citation 
omitted). 
127. Magnusson, Non-communicable Diseases and Global Health Governance, 
supra note 31, at 8. See also McGrady, Trade Liberalisation and Tobacco Control, 
supra note 31, at 280; Baumberg & Anderson, supra note 31, at 1952; Callard, 
Chitanondh & Weissman, supra note 31, at 69; Ira S. Shapiro, Treating Cigarettes 
as an Exception to the Trade Rules, XXII SAIS REVIEW 87, 94 (2002). 
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Thus, it is clear that, although health appears to receive relatively 
good protection in most of the WTO agreements, at least insofar as 
they are likely to be relevant to noncommunicable disease prevention, 
there is inevitably a degree of uncertainty about the impact of trade 
agreements on particular measures that governments may wish to 
adopt. For those interested in the protection of public health, a key 
challenge is to build bridges between the systems of trade governance 
and health governance in order to ensure that the importance—and 
the facts—of health are sufficiently understood and valued within the 
governance of trade. 
V. IN SEARCH OF COHERENCE 
A. The World Health Organization and the World Trade 
Organization 
The WHO was established in 1948 with an ambitious objective: 
―the attainment by all people of the highest possible level of 
health.‖128 The WHO is a UN specialized agency for the purposes of 
Article 57 of the UN Charter,129 pursuant to an agreement between the 
UN and the WHO.130 The WHO is provided by its Constitution with 
an extremely broad mandate to protect and promote international 
health, befitting its designation as the UN specialized agency in the 
field. It has a wide range of functions, which are set out in Article 2 
of its Constitution, including: to act as the ―directing and 
coordinating authority on international health work‖;131 to ―establish 
and maintain effective collaboration with the United Nations, 
specialized agencies, governmental health administrations, 
professional groups and such other organizations as may be deemed 
appropriate‖;132 to ―propose conventions, agreements and regulations, 
and make recommendations with respect to international health 
matters and to perform such duties as may be assigned thereby to the 
Organization and are consistent with its objective‖;133 to ―promote 
 
128. Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 1, July 22, 1946, 62 
Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution], available at 
http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf. 
129. U.N. Charter art. 57.  
130. Agreement between the United Nations and the World Health 
Organization, Nov.12, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 193, available at http://apps.who.int/ 
gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/cover-and-contents-en.pdf.  
131. WHO Constitution, supra note 128, art. 2(a). 
132. Id. art. 2(b). 
133. Id. art. 2(k). 
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and conduct research in the field of health‖;134 to ―provide 
information, counsel and assistance in the field of health;‖135 to 
―develop, establish and promote international standards with respect 
to food, biological, pharmaceutical and similar products‖;136 and 
―generally to take all necessary action to attain the objective of the 
Organization.‖137 
The WTO was established in 1994 by the Marrakesh Agreement to 
―provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of 
trade relations among its Members in matters related to‖ a range of 
agreements.138 Its functions are set out in Article III of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.139 The WTO is intended to facilitate the implementation, 
administration and operation of the WTO agreements, and 
negotiations among members concerning their trade relations; to 
administer the DSU and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism; and to 
cooperate with other international institutions in global economic 
policy making.140 
B. What Role for the WHO in the Governance of Trade and 
Health? 
As illustrated in Part I, trade has profound effects on health at 
multiple levels. The UN specialized agency for international health, 
with a mandate as broad as that of the WHO, has a clear 
responsibility to monitor and engage in ―trade and health‖ issues. But 
it is not clear how or to what extent the WHO should play a role in 
trade and health governance or how the inevitable overlap between its 
mandate and that of the WTO should be managed. 
At one level, the question about the WHO‘s role is a broader one 
about the role it should perform in relation to health-relevant 
international law making generally, in a world in which, as noted 
earlier, there is a large ―body of international law that powerfully 
affects global health in areas ranging from food safety, arms control, 
and the environment to trade and human rights‖141 and beyond. Taylor 
 
134. Id. art. 2(n). 
135. Id. art. 2(q). 
136. Id. art. 2(u). 
137. WHO Constitution, supra note 128, art. 2(v). 
138. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 108, art. II. 
139. See id. art. III. 
140. Id. 
141. Gostin, supra note 56, at 996. 
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argues that the WHO ―has a unique directive to provide leadership 
and promote rational and effective development of the evolving field 
of international health law.‖142 This does not mean full centralization 
of all international health law-making functions under the WHO‘s 
auspices143 but rather ―leadership in coordinating codification and 
implementation efforts among the diverse global actors actively 
engaged in health lawmaking [which] could, in theory, foster the 
development of a more effective, integrated and rational legal regime 
and, consequently, better collective management of global health 
concerns.‖144 The WHO could ―serve as a coordinator, catalyst, and, 
where appropriate, platform for important international health 
agreements.‖145 
The idea that the WHO should seek to provide leadership in 
international health law making—or norm making more broadly—is 
an appealing one for those concerned about coherence in global 
health governance, but the realities are exceedingly complex, both 
within the WHO and in its inter-institutional relationships. 
Particularly difficult challenges arise in the trade and health context. 
Part IV explained trade‘s dominance of the trade–health governance 
relationship. In contrast to the institutional framework within which 
the WHO operates, the WTO regime embodies a wide range of 
―hard‖ legal obligations backed up by a compulsory dispute 
settlement system.  
As noted earlier, WTO legal norms are developed not only by the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council but also by the 
panels and the Appellate Body. While a panel has the ability to ―seek 
information and technical advice from any individual or body which 
it deems appropriate,‖146 ―seek information from any relevant 
source,‖147 and ―consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain 
aspects of the matter‖148—and both GATT149 and WTO panels150 have 
 
142. Taylor, supra note 54, at 504. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 505. 
145. Id. at 507. See also Gostin, supra note 56, at 996. 
146. DSU, supra note 69, art. 13.1. 
147. Id. art. 13.2. 
148. Id. 
149. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Thailand–Restrictions on Importation of and 
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, paras. 50–56, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, at 216–18 (1991), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_E/dispu_e/90cigart.pdf. ―In Thailand Cigarettes, the Panel rather 
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received information from the WHO—panels remain independent 
and make their own decisions. While the WHO can provide 
information, this information does not carry any special weight, 
however important the WHO—and the global health community it 
represents—might consider the outcome of a dispute for global 
health. 
While the WHO has been criticized for not engaging more robustly 
in trade and health issues,151 it has been far from inactive. The WHA 
and the Executive Board have addressed trade and health in various 
contexts, including the impacts of trade agreements on access to 
drugs, particularly with respect to HIV/AIDS, health and intellectual 
property rights more broadly, the relationship of trade agreements to 
international migration of health personnel, negotiations to revise the 
IHR, and aspects of the FCTC.152 In 2000, the WHO established a 
small programme on globalisation, trade, and health, which has been 
evolving since and is now part of its trade, foreign policy, diplomacy, 
and health programme.153 In 2006, the WHA adopted a resolution on 
international trade and health,154 which urged the WHO‘s member 
states to implement a range of measures designed to improve 
domestic ―trade and health‖ capacity and enhance coherence; the 
resolution also requested the Secretariat, through the Director–
General, to provide support to member states on ―trade and health,‖ 
build capacity, and ―continue collaborating with the competent 
international organizations in order to support policy coherence 
 
awkwardly consulted the WHO in order to access scientific expertise, which it then 
disregarded.‖ Atik, supra note 4, at 599. 
150. Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 4.137, 4.140, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm. 
151. Gostin, supra note 56, at 996–97. 
152. WHO, Exec. Bd., 116th Sess., Geneva, Switz., May 26–27, 2005, 
International Trade and Health: Report by the Secretariat, EB116/4, para. 1 (Apr. 
28, 2005) [hereinafter WHO, International Trade and Health]. See also Margaret 
Bomba, Exploring Legal Frameworks to Mitigate the Negative Effects of 
International Health-Worker Migration, 89 B. U. L. REV. 1103, 1124–33 (2009). 
153. Lee, Sridhar & Patel, supra note 71, at 419. See also Taylor, supra note 54, 
at 505. For the programme‘s website, see World Health Organization, Trade, 
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and Health, http://www.who.int/trade/en/ (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2010). 
154. WHA International Trade and Health Resolution, Res. WHA59.26, 
WHA59/2006/REC/1 (May 27, 2006) [hereinafter WHA International Trade and 
Health Resolution], available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA59/ 
A59_R26-en.pdf. 
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between trade and health sectors at regional and global levels, 
including generating and sharing evidence on the relationship 
between trade and health . . . .‖155 The resolution was adopted: 
Recognizing the demand for information on the possible 
implications of international trade and trade agreements for 
health and health policy at national, regional and global levels; 
  Mindful of the need for all relevant ministries, including 
those of health, trade, commerce, finance and foreign affairs, 
to work together constructively in order to ensure that the 
interests of trade and health are appropriately balanced and 
coordinated . . . .156 
In respect of the intersection between intellectual property rights 
and access to medicines, since 1996, the WHO has closely monitored 
the implementation of TRIPs and advised member states on ways of 
using TRIPS‘ ―flexibilities‖ to allow them to achieve health goals.157 
In 2004, it established, pursuant to a 2003 WHA Resolution,158 the 
WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and 
Public Health (IPRIPH), which reported to the WHA in 2006.159 
Having considered the IRPIPH Commission‘s report, the WHA 
requested the convening of an Intergovernmental Working Group 
(IGWG) to develop a global strategy and plan of action in order to 
provide a medium-term framework based on the Commission‘s 
recommendations.160 The IGWG completed its work in 2008, when 
the WHA adopted the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property.161 The WHO now has a 
Secretariat on Public Health, Innovation, and Intellectual Property 
(PHI), which focuses on implementation of the global strategy.162 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Helfer, supra note 48, at 42. 
158. See WHA Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
Resolution, Res. WHA56.27, A56/VR/10 (May 28, 2003). 
159. WHO, Comm‘n on Intell. Prop. Rts., Innovation and Pub. Health, Public 
Health Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (2006) [hereinafter 
IPRIPH Report], available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/ 
index.html. 
160. See Res. WHA59.24, A59VR/9 (May 27, 2006). 
161. See Res. WHA61.21, A61/VR/8 (May 24, 2008). 
162. See WHO, About PHI, http://www.who.int/phi/about/en/ (last visited Mar. 
17, 2010). 
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The WHO has described its trade and health work as consisting of 
three main functions: performing analysis and research to better 
inform policy decisions, negotiations, dispute settlement, and agenda 
setting; creating tools and training materials to build capacity in 
member states; and meeting country requests for support in specific 
trade and health issues, either through country missions or regional or 
interregional workshops.163 The WHO has produced a range of 
materials on trade and health issues, which are available either on its 
website or upon request.164 It has collaborated with the WTO 
Secretariat, including by producing a 2002 joint study on WTO 
Agreements and Public Health165 and developing and conducting 
training courses on multilateral agreements and public health.166 It has 
been granted observer status at the WTO Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, and ad hoc observer status in the Council for Trade in 
Services, the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, and the Council for Trade in Services, Special 
Sessions.167 It is currently collaborating with the WTO, the World 
Bank, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
international experts, and trade and health policy makers from ten 
countries to develop a ―diagnostic tool and companion workbook‖ in 
trade and health that will guide national policymakers in developing 
national policies and strategies related to trade and health and 
structuring their requests for capacity building on issues related to 
trade and health.168 As noted above, the WHO has also provided 
information to GATT and WTO panels. 
 
163. WHO, International Trade and Health, supra note 152, para. 10. 
164. See WHO, Trade and Health,  
http://www.who.int/trade/resource/tradewp/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 
2010). 
165. See WHO and WTO Secretariat, WTO Agreements and Public Health: A 
Joint Study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat (2002), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/whowtoe.pdf. 
166. WHO, International Trade and Health, supra note 152, para. 14. 
167. See WTO, International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted 
Observer Status to WTO Bodies,  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
168. See WHO, Trade and Health—Trade, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy and 
Health, http://www.who.int/trade/resource/tradewp/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 
17, 2010). See also Richard D. Smith, Kelley Lee & Nick Drager, Trade and 
Health: An Agenda for Action, 373 LANCET 768, 772 (2009). 
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C. The WHO as a Standard Setter 
One area in which the WHO has performed a role in respect of the 
governance of the trade and health relationship and in which some 
public health scholars and advocates argue that it should be more 
proactive is in the development of international standards. Derek 
Yach and Robert Beaglehole write of the ―increasing need to 
establish global norms in a wide range of spheres to balance the 
otherwise unrestrained influences of powerful policy actors.‖169 To do 
so, they argue, ―public health capacities in trade and political science 
must be strengthened so as to effectively participate in the WTO 
where health issues are increasingly considered and to develop 
stronger WHO-led norms that could be used as the basis for resolving 
trade disputes in relation to products with health impacts.‖170 
Magnusson sees international standards on diet and nutrition, for 
example, as having ―a positive impact on global health by serving to 
‗WTO proof‘ domestic and regional responses to chronic disease.‖171 
Baumberg and Anderson note the calls for a legally binding 
international Framework Convention on Alcohol Policy, either 
modelled on the FCTC or using an alternate approach, and argue that 
―[t]his would not automatically make WTO-inconsistent policies 
somehow permissible, but it would provide an international 
community of support for such policies, and potentially help to 
manage the relationship between alcohol and trade. It may also add 
weight to the defence of such policies under trade disputes . . . .‖172 
The notion that the WHO should develop standards to assist in 
managing the trade and health relationship makes substantial 
institutional sense. As Magnussson points out, the WTO ―is neither a 
scientific nor a health agency and it does not develop standards.‖173 
But there are many different kinds of international standards and 
many different ways in which international standards may be relevant 
to the governance of trade and health, and the role that WHO can or 
should play will vary with these different kinds of standards. 
The most direct way in which WHO-developed standards can have 
 
169. Yach & Beaglehole, supra note 39, at 228. 
170. Id. (citations omitted). 
171. Magnusson, Rethinking Global Health Challenges, supra note 31, at 270. 
172. Baumberg & Anderson, supra note 31, at 1956 (citations omitted). 
173. Magnusson, Non-communicable Diseases and Global Health Governance, 
supra note 31, at 7 (citation omitted). 
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an impact on trade and health governance is through their effect 
under the TBT and SPS Agreements. Under Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement, WTO members are required to use any relevant 
international standards ―as a basis for their technical regulations‖ 
unless such standards would be ―an ineffective or inappropriate 
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued . . . .‖174 
Under Article 2.5, whenever a technical regulation applied for a 
legitimate objective is ―in accordance with relevant international 
standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade.‖175  
Under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, subject to certain 
exceptions, in order to ―[h]armonize sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures on as wide a basis as possible, . . .‖ WTO members are 
required to ―base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they 
exist . . . .‖176 Under Article 3.2, measures which ―conform to 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations . . . [are] 
deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant 
provisions . . .‖177 of the SPS Agreement and the GATT. Annex A of 
the SPS Agreement identifies the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a 
body established and administered jointly by the FAO and the WHO, 
as the recognized international standard setter for food safety.178 Atik 
writes that as a practical matter this means that such measures enjoy 
―substantial immunity‖ from challenge before the WTO dispute 
settlement system.179 
However, beyond these two examples, in which international 
standards have an explicit role in the application of the WTO 
agreements, the precise purpose and effect of international standards 
developed by or through the WHO are much less clear. There may be 
dangers in entering too far into territory likely to be marked by some 
of the less desirable features of fragmentation. 
 
 
174. TBT Agreement, supra note 86, art. 2.4. 
175. Id. art. 2.5. 
176. SPS Agreement, supra note 87, art. 3.1. 
177. Id. art. 3.2. 
178. Id. Annex A, para. 3(a).  
179. Atik, supra note 4, at 602. 
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D. Health Agreements to ―Counterbalance‖ the Effects of WTO 
Agreements? 
The FCTC is the first treaty negotiated under the auspices of the 
WHO. The FCTC‘s Foreword records that it was ―developed in 
response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic,‖ an epidemic 
―facilitated through a variety of complex factors with cross-border 
effects, including trade liberalization and direct foreign investment. 
Other factors such as global marketing, transnational tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and the international 
movement of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes have also 
contributed to the explosive increase in tobacco use.‖180 The framing 
of the FCTC, in significant part, as a response to trade liberalization 
is common in the literature.181 
Writing in 2002, when the FCTC was still being negotiated, Jose 
Alvarez argued that the idea that a tobacco control treaty should be 
negotiated through the WHO could be seen as a proposal that ―one 
international organization, the WHO, regulate tobacco at least in part 
because another, the WTO, has been altogether too successful in 
reducing barriers to the tobacco trade and has ignored the resulting 
negative externalities.‖182 In 2005, after its adoption by the WHA, 
Maya Prabhu and Sumudu Ataputtu wrote that the ―FCTC represents 
the first time that the WHO has exercised its considerable treaty-
making powers in the name of public health, as an explicit 
counterbalance to another international legal regime.‖183 They 
described the FCTC as: 
a response to the World Trade Organization‘s (WTO) very 
success in reducing barriers to the international tobacco trade, 
at the expense of significant health externalities. Thus, the 
FCTC marks a new chapter in the health vs. trade debates, 
 
180. WHO, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at v (2003), 
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241591013.pdf.  
181. See, e.g., Allyn L. Taylor & Douglas Bettcher, WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control: A Global ―Good‖ for Public Health, 78 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 920, 924–25 (2000). See also McGrady, Trade and Tobacco 
Control, supra note 31. 
182. Jose E. Alvarez, ‗The WTO as Linkage Machine‘, 96 AM. J. INT‘L. L. 146, 
149 (2002). 
183. Maya Prabhu & Sumudu Atapattu, The WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control: When the WHO Meets the WTO, in SUSTAINABLE JUSTICE: 
RECONCILING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 365, 366 (Marie-
Claire Cordonier Segger & C. G. Weeramantry eds., 2005) (emphasis added). 
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debates which the authors believe are more likely to be 
amplified in the future.184 
This idea of establishing health treaties to ―counterbalance‖ the 
effect of WTO agreements appears to have taken root. Labonte and 
Sanger argue that the FCTC ―has raised the possibility of creating 
other health specific conventions outside of the ambit of WTO or 
other trade treaties‖ and that ―[b]y promoting conventions such as 
these national governments can strengthen the international legal and 
institutional basis for collaboration to promote health, and provide a 
counterbalance to international trade treaties.‖185 In an exploration 
of possible international arrangements to address the harms caused by 
alcohol, Room argues that the ―strongest argument‖ against adopting 
a nonbinding instrument ―may be the competitive force of binding 
conventions or treaties which intersect with the subject-matter under 
consideration.‖186 The ―existence and development of trade and free 
market agreements globally (under the World Trade Organization), 
regionally and bilaterally‖ is a ―major consideration‖ with respect to 
psychoactive substances which are also trade commodities, such as 
tobacco, alcohol, and medications.187 Room continues: ―Trade dispute 
adjudications and negotiations have constrained the abilities of 
national and sub-national governments to restrict the alcohol market, 
and further such restrictions are under consideration. A binding 
public health-orientated agreement on alcohol is needed as a means 
of countering these developments.‖188  
This notion that legally binding agreements should be developed in 
one multilateral institution explicitly to counterbalance the effects of 
legally binding agreements developed through another represents a 
manifestation of what Laurence Helfer has described as ―regime 
shifting‖—―an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty 
negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from 
one international venue to another.‖189 Regime shifting provides an 
opportunity to generate ―counterregime norms,‖ either binding treaty 
rules or nonbinding soft law standards that ―seek to alter the 
 
184. Id. 
185. Labonte & Sanger, supra note 106, at 742 (emphasis added). 
186. Room, supra note 31, at 586. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 589 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
189. Helfer, supra note 48, at 14 (citation omitted). 
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prevailing legal landscape.‖190 Not surprisingly, both states and NGOs 
seek out the forum most likely to deliver their desired policy 
outcomes, basing their ultimate choices on such factors as differences 
in state membership and influence, law-making methods, 
mechanisms for monitoring and dispute settlement, institutional 
cultures, and permeability to outside influence.191 They will often 
deliberately seek to create ―strategic inconsistency‖192 ―to force 
change by explicitly crafting rules in one elemental regime that are 
incompatible with those in another.‖193 This can then ―set the agenda‖ 
for future efforts, with diplomats operating in a legalized setting 
uncomfortable with ―the existence of a glaring inconsistency across 
regimes . . .‖ and looking for ways to ―restore rule alignment.‖194 
While the pursuit of a ―counterbalancing‖ effect or the creation of 
strategic inconsistency can be unsettling for lawyers—the ―drive for 
consistency‖ being ―a hallmark of legalization‖195—it is not without 
both political and policy merit. It can be used to generate positive 
policy outcomes that could not be achieved through working only in 
the initial forum. Nevertheless, its effectiveness in practice can be 
difficult to predict and when used as a counter to WTO treaties, it 
raises particular challenges.  
First, it is not clear what effect legally binding agreements of the 
kind proposed, negotiated, and adopted through the WHO (or another 
body) would have on WTO obligations (and WTO panel and 
Appellate Body decisions). Of course, it ultimately depends what the 
content of such agreements is, how they deal with potential conflicts, 
and who their parties end up being. However, unless such agreements 
included specific conflicts clauses under which they would prevail 
over WTO agreements in the event of conflict and all WTO members 
became parties to such agreements—conditions rather unlikely to 
come into effect—significant uncertainty would remain.  
With respect to the former condition, the story of the negotiation of 
the FCTC is perhaps instructive. Taylor describes ―the relationship 
 
190. Id. 
191. Id. See also Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International 
Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2007). 
192. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic 
Resources, 58 INT‘L ORG. 277, 301 (2004). 
193. Id. at 301–02. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 300. 
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between trade law and the FCTC‖ as ―a keenly contested issue‖ 
throughout the negotiations.196 The contest was between the positions 
that the FCTC should take precedence over trade obligations in the 
event of conflict and that the FCTC should be developed and applied 
in a manner consistent with existing international trade law.197 The 
contest was ultimately resolved on the final day of the sixth and final 
negotiating session, with the inclusion in the preamble of the words 
―Determined to give priority to their right to protect public health‖198 
but with the treaty remaining silent on conflicts between the FCTC 
and agreements, such as the WTO Agreements, concluded earlier in 
time, allowing Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties199 to apply in the event of any conflict between the FCTC 
and any WTO agreements.200  
While no two sets of negotiations are identical, either in their 
political and institutional context or their treatment of major 
substantive questions, the FCTC experience suggests that it should 
not be assumed that other health agreements negotiated through the 
WHO (or another body) would include a conflicts clause of the kind 
that was not agreed to in the tobacco context. It is arguable that the 
case for priority to tobacco control measures over trade obligations is 
a stronger one than for alcohol or unhealthy foods, for example, 
given the scale of harm caused by tobacco and the fact that, unlike 
these other products, it is inherently harmful and has no safe level of 
use.  
With respect to the latter condition, the WTO has 153 members.201 
It is unlikely that all would become parties to these other proposed 
agreements—certainly not unless their content was largely 
uncontroversial and accordingly rather ―weak.‖ This is significant 
 
196. Allyn L. Taylor, Trade, Human Rights and the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control: Just What the Doctor Ordered?, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 322, 326 (Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn & 
Elisabeth Bürgi eds., 2005). 
197. Id. at 326–28. 
198. WHO FCTC, supra note 79, pmbl. 
199. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instrume 
nts/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
200. Taylor, supra note 196, at 326–28. 
201. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization—Member and 
Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
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because the obligations contained in such agreements—including any 
effects on WTO obligations—would not apply to states that did not 
become parties to them.202 Further, the extent to which WTO panels 
can take account at all of non-WTO obligations that are not held by 
all WTO members is a highly contested question.203  
Thus, even between states that were both WTO members and 
parties to the health agreements, the effects of the health agreements 
on trade obligations would likely be uncertain. The legal effects on 
obligations owed to WTO members that did not become parties to 
such health agreements would likely be minimal at best. 
This is not to say that legally binding norms agreed to through the 
WHO (or another forum) would have no effect on WTO obligations. 
It is likely that—at least if widely ratified—they would have 
significant political impact, increasing the political threshold for 
bringing trade challenges with respect to matters covered by such 
norms. They might also be used by panels, whether explicitly or sub 
silentio, for example, in consideration of the necessity of health 
measures, including, perhaps, in assessing the importance of interests 
at stake or in demonstrating that certain measures are better regarded 
as complementary than alternative.  
Nevertheless, there is a legitimate concern that negotiation and 
adoption of agreements in one institution, such as the WHO, in order 
to ―counterbalance‖ the effects of WTO agreements, at least without 
also attempting to build substantial linkages between the two 
institutions (and other relevant institutions) with respect to the 
subject matter of the proposed agreements, could be a recipe for 
 
202. See Werner Meng, Conflicting Rules in the WHO FCTC and Their Impact, 
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 334, 335 (Thomas Cottier, Joost 
Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Bürgi eds., 2005).  
203. See, e.g., F. Baetens, Muddling the Waters of Treaty Interpretation? 
Relevant Rules of International Law in the MOX Plant OSPAR Arbitration and EC 
- Biotech Case, 77 NORDIC J. INT‘L L.197 (2008); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF 
NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation 
and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. 
J. INT‘L L. 903 (2004); David Palmeter & Petros C Mavoridis, The WTO Legal 
System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT‘L L. 398 (1998); Gabrielle Marceau, WTO 
Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EURO. J. INT‘L L. 753 (2002); Benn 
McGrady, Fragmentation of International Law or ―Systemic Integration‖ of Treaty 
Regimes: EC-Biotech Products and the Proper Interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 589 (2008). 
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trouble—including poorly conceived law, significant uncertainty for 
both states and the institutions involved, inefficiency in the use of 
resources, and difficulties in implementation. 
It should be pointed out that, of course, the WHO and WTO are 
institutions composed of and governed by states. There is substantial 
overlap between the WHO‘s 193 members204 and WTO‘s 153 
members. Thus a counterbalancing strategy does not simply 
potentially set two international institutions against one another. It 
also potentially creates cleavage between different government 
departments within the same state. This is likely to be more of a 
problem in some states than others, depending on their capacity to 
manage such governance challenges. Fidler notes that even highly 
developed countries with significant governance capacities have had 
struggles in dealing with globalized problems, and ―[m]any 
developing and least-developed countries do not . . . have the 
governance capacity to address adequately globalized problems.‖205  
E. The Need for Inter-Institutional Processes 
The most obvious response to the challenges and opportunities of 
fragmentation is of course better and principled coordination between 
those institutions whose mandates either overlap or complement one 
another (or both). Cottier, Pauwelyn, and Bürgi observe that, ―[w]hile 
institutions may be set up differently and operate side-by-side, real-
life problems do not respect jurisdictional boundaries, and law-
making in different institutions inherently spills over into other 
regulatory fields.‖206 Law making ―needs to entail mutual information 
and interaction between different fora and organizations.‖207 This is 
not only to avoid conflict but also to allow ―norm-creating 
organizations to draw from each other‘s unique competencies and 
mandates in order to deliver a better end-product to the international 
community.‖208 Such inter-institutional cooperation is most likely to 
be effective when it conforms to emerging principles of global 
administrative law that seek to safeguard transparent, reasoned, and 
 
204. World Health Organization, Countries (2010), http://www.who.int/coun 
tries/en (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).  
205. Fidler, supra note 15, at 302. 
206. Cottier, Pauwelyn & Bürgi, supra note 53, at 8. 
207. Id. 
208. Mosoti, supra note 42, at 173. 
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legitimate regulatory and administrative decision making.209 
In the final article of the Lancet series, Smith, Lee, and Drager set 
out ―an agenda for action.‖210 The authors make a number of 
suggestions for achieving greater coherence between trade and 
health, with action recommended at both the domestic and 
international levels to strengthen evidence on trade and health links; 
build trade and health engagement and capacity; and assert health 
goals in trade policy.211 They make recommendations for action by a 
range of entities including the WHO, the WTO, the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), national governments, NGOs 
and civil society, foundations, and academics.212 If adopted, their 
recommendations would assist in effecting the kind of inter-sectoral 
dialogue, learning, and decision making that forms the essential 
foundation of coherent policy making and implementation. 
Building on these recommendations, this Article focuses on action 
that might be taken to build more effective institutional linkages 
between the two key international agencies in the field, the WHO and 
the WTO. It is axiomatic that effective cooperation between these 
two organizations is essential to coherence at the international level 
(as well as at the domestic level). It is critical to recognize that the 
WHO can only do so much on its own. If trade dominates the trade–
health relationship by virtue of the relative legal and political strength 
of the WTO regime as compared to that of the WHO and the 
fragmented regime of global health governance more broadly and 
health does poorly as a result of that dominance, it seems clear that 
the problem cannot be adequately addressed without action both 
involving and within the WTO, through which the value of health and 
an understanding of its determinants becomes more deeply 
internalized within the WTO system.  
F. Exploring Some Possibilities 
Some possible approaches are suggested here for further 
exploration. The aim of the suggested arrangements is to facilitate the 
kind of inter-institutional discussion, development of mutual 
understanding, and cooperation needed to maximize the benefits and 
 
209. See generally Mitchell & Sheargold, supra note 27. 
210. Smith, Lee & Drager, supra note 168. 
211. Id. at 769–72.  
212. Id. 
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minimize the risks of fragmentation.213  
1. A Formal Relationship Should Be Established 
Between the WHO and the WTO  
The WTO has signed cooperation agreements with the IMF, the 
World Bank, WIPO,214 and the Office International des Epizooties 
(OIE)215 and a memorandum of understanding with UNCTAD.216 The 
IMF and the World Bank have observer status in WTO bodies as 
provided for in their Agreements with the WTO, whereas, as noted 
above, the WHO has observer status in only two committees (the 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade) and ad hoc observer 
status in only three committees (the Council for Trade in Services, 
Council for Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, and 
the Council for Trade in Services, Special Sessions).217 The WHO has 
entered into agreements with the International Labour Organization 
(ILO),218 FAO,219 UNESCO,220 the International Atomic Energy 
 
 213. This Article does not examine the possibility of amendments being made to 
any of the WTO Agreements or a radical change to global health governance 
involving a ―hardening‖ of legal obligations, such as by agreement to new, more 
specific health-related legal obligations or the introduction of dispute settlement 
procedures that might rival those of the WTO. This is not to suggest that such 
developments could never occur but rather to explore some more incremental 
changes that might be made within existing arrangements. Other suggestions 
include the encouragement by the WTO of its members to ratify human rights 
treaties and the enforcement of such requirement through the use of trade sanctions 
and the dispute settlement system. See generally Phillip Countryman, International 
Trade and World Health Policy: Helping People Reach their Full Potential, 21 
PACE INT‘L L. REV. 241, 273–78 (2009). 
214. TRIPS Agreement: WTO-WIPO Cooperation Agreement, Dec. 22, 2005, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPs_e/wtowip_e.htm.  
215. See WHO Agreement with the Office International des Epizooties, Res. 
WHA57.7, A57/DIV/5 (May 22, 2004) [hereinafter WHO-OIE Agreement].  
216. Steve A. Charnowitz, A New WTO Paradigm for Trade and the 
Environment, 11 SINGAPORE Y.B. OF INT‘L L. 15, 29 (2007) (citation omitted). 
217. WTO, About the Organization—International Intergovernmental 
Organizations Granted Observer Status to WTO Bodies, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/igo_obs_e.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
218. Agreement Between the International Labour Organization and the World 
Health Organization, July 10, 1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 270 [hereinafter ILO-WHO 
Agreement]. 
219. Agreement Between the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World 
Health Organization, Dec. 13, 1948, 76 U.N.T.S. 172 [hereinafter FAO-WHO 
Agreement]. 
220. Agreement Between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization, July 17, 1948, 44 
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Agency (IAEA),221 the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO),222 the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD),223 the Universal Postal Union (UPU),224 and the 
OIE.225 
A formal cooperation agreement would be useful both as a symbol 
of mutual recognition of the importance of the relationship between 
the two bodies—and between trade and health—and as providing a 
formal framework for ongoing discussions of linked issues and 
development, implementation, and monitoring of joint activities.226 
Such an agreement could, for example, allow for exchanges of 
personnel between the two organizations,227 a proactive step to build 
relationships and deepen understanding.  
2. Joint Committees of Members of the Two Bodies 
Should Be Established on Specific Trade and Health 
Issues, such as on Trade and Noncommunicable 
Diseases  
Formal fora for discussion between states and sub-state regulatory 
actors, administered and technically supported by the Secretariats of 
the two organizations, should enable exploration of issues from both 
trade and health perspectives, the seeking of common ground, and 
significant learning for states and the two institutions. Issues to be 
addressed by the committees could be identified by the WHA as the 
governing body of the specialized agency responsible for 
 
U.N.T.S. 324. 
221.  Agreement Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
World Health Organization, May 28, 1959, 339 U.N.T.S. 388. 
222.  Agreement Between the World Health Organization and the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, May 19, 1989, 1549 U.N.T.S. 403 
[hereinafter UNIDO-WHO Agreement]. 
223.  WHO, Resolution of the 33rd World Health Assembly: Agreement between 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the World Health 
Organization, WHA33.21 (May 23, 1980). 
224. WHO, Resolution of the 52nd World Health Assembly: Agreement between 
the World Health Organization and the Universal Postal Union, WHA52.6 (May 
24, 1999). 
225. WHO-OIE Agreement, supra note 215. 
226. See Lee, Sridhar & Patel, supra note 71, at 420. 
227. WHO‘s agreements with the ILO (art. V), the FAO (art VII), and 
UNESCO (art. VI) allow for ―interchange of personnel on a temporary or 
permanent basis, in appropriate cases, in order to obtain the maximum benefit from 
their services.‖ In the agreement between the WHO and UNIDO (art. 8), the two 
organizations ―agree to co-operate in order to facilitate the interchange of staff and 
to promote efficiency and effective co-ordination on their respective activities.‖ 
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international health (at which the WTO has observer status).228 
Reports of such committees could be provided to the WTO General 
Council and the WHA through the Director–Generals of the two 
organizations.229  
3. Joint Inter-Secretariat Committees Should Be 
Established Between the WTO and the WHO on 
Specific Trade and Health Issues, Again such as Trade 
and Noncommunicable Diseases 
Matters to be addressed by such committees could be agreed to by 
the Director–Generals of the two organizations. The purpose would 
be similar to that of joint committees of member states, though work 
done by the secretariats should be deeper, more technical, and carried 
out in a less overtly political context. Regular reports on the work of 
such committees could be provided to the joint committees of 
members of the two bodies recommended above to enhance the 
transparency and legitimacy of the activity. The work of inter-
secretariat committees could assist in the identification of priority 
issues for reference to joint committees of states and facilitate the 
effective working of such committees once established.230  
4. A Committee on Trade and Health Should Be 
Established Within the WTO, with the WHO Having 
Observer Status and Being Encouraged to Actively 
Participate in its Work  
The establishment of such a committee would signal the 
importance to be attached to health by the WTO and provide a forum 
 
228. WTO, Work with other International Organizations, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/coher_e.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 
2010). 
229. WHO‘s agreements with the ILO (art. III), the FAO (art. III) and UNESCO 
(art. IV), and UNIDO (art. 6) allow for the establishment of joint Committees to 
which ―any question of common interest‖ may be referred. ILO-WHO Agreement, 
supra note 218, art. III; FAO-WHO Agreement, supra note 219, art. III; UNESCO-
WHO Agreement, supra note 201, art. IV; UNIDO-WHO Agreement, supra note 
222, art. 6.  
230. The WHO‘s agreement with FAO (art. VI) provides for establishment by 
agreement of ―inter-secretariat committees to facilitate co-operation in connexion 
with specific programmes of work or projected activities with which the two 
organizations may be mutually concerned.‖ The WHO‘s agreement with the IAEA 
(art. V) provides for the establishment of joint committees of secretariats to be 
convened ―when appropriate to consider questions of substantive interest to both 
parties.‖ 
MITCHELL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  1:45 PM 
184 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:143 
within the WTO for discussion of health issues by states.231 Such 
WTO committees exist with respect to the environment and 
development, established by the Ministerial Conference.232 
Alternatively, such a committee (or committees) could be established 
with respect to particular issues of trade and health, perhaps after 
request by the WHA.  
5. Inter-Agency Task Forces on Specific ―Trade and 
Health‖ Issues of Concern Should Be Established, 
Including the WHO, the WTO and Other Relevant 
Agencies  
There is currently a United Nations Ad Hoc Interagency Task 
Force on Tobacco Control, which is chaired by the WHO and 
comprises seventeen agencies of the United Nations system and two 
organizations outside the UN system, including the WTO.233 The UN 
Secretary General provides a report to the Economic and Social 
Council every two years on progress made by the Task Force.234 One 
possibility worth exploring would be broadening the mandate of the 
Task Force to deal with noncommunicable diseases more broadly, not 
only tobacco control. There would likely be substantial learning 
through consideration of the similarities and differences among 
various noncommunicable diseases, their risk factors, and strategies 
for addressing them. To be effective, the Task Force should meet 
regularly, and annual reports rather than biennial reports should be 
prepared.  
For each of these proposals, the active participation of 
representatives of civil society should be provided for, enhancing the 
 
231. Fidler suggests such a committee or working group and notes that it could 
provide ―a catalyst for broadening and deepening domestic attempts to integrate 
trade and health policies.‖ Fidler, supra note 15, at 317. 
232. WTO–The Committee on Trade and Environment, http://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_ committee_e.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2010); WTO–
The Committee on Trade and Development, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e 
/devel_e/d3ctte_e.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). Charnowitz writes of the 
Committee on Trade and the Environment that although it has not reached any 
significant decisions, it may be having some positive impact, in serving as a 
continuing forum on international trade and the environment. Charnowitz, supra 
note 217, at 28. 
233. WHO, United Nations Ad Hoc Interagency Task Force on Tobacco 
Control, http://www.who.int/tobacco/global_interaction/un_taskforce/en/ (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2010).  
234. Id. 
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transparency and legitimacy of the work being performed as well as 
its quality.  
The idea behind these proposals is not only to facilitate dialogue 
and understanding, though these would be valuable outcomes in 
themselves. It would be hoped that the suggested processes would 
ultimately lead to the development of norms and institutional 
practices that better integrated legitimate health objectives into trade 
policy making235 and implementation, and legitimate trade objectives 
into health policy making and implementation. Conflicts between 
trade and health cannot be avoided, but they can surely be better 
managed.  
It is not suggested that it would be easy to achieve all or even any 
of the above proposals. Questions of political will, resources, and 
governance arrangements would of course arise. It should also be 
acknowledged that, for those whose primary interest is in the 
promotion and protection of health, the proposals carry risks. They 
could lead to changes in the dynamic within the WHO, bringing more 
―trade people‖ into its work, potentially diluting its health focus and 
weakening the norms that it develops, at least from a health 
perspective. They may also affect the organizational culture within 
the WHO. For example, the WHO is generally regarded as more open 
and more inclusive of nongovernmental organizations than the 
WTO.236 This possibility of inter-institutional influence with respect 
to norms of process, manifested in either formal rules or less formal 
institutional practices, should be carefully examined.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
As last year‘s Lancet series on trade and health demonstrates, there 
are genuine problems in the governance of trade and health, both at 
the international and domestic levels. As this Article has argued, 
these are examples of much wider global governance stresses, which 
 
235. For example, declarations on ―trade and health‖ matters could be made by 
the Ministerial Council or interpretations issued by the Ministerial Council or the 
General Council under Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement. GATT Annex 
1A, supra note 5, art. IX:2. 
 236. For a discussion of the culture of the WTO, see, for example, Mosoti, 
supra note 42, at 175; Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the World Trade 
Organization: Building a Foundation of Administrative Law, 10 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 
509 (2007); Steger, supra note 114, at 140–41; Edith Brown Weiss, Trade, 
Investment and the Environment: Closed Boxes?, 100 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 
25, 25–26 (2006). 
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create fundamental challenges for both the WTO and the WHO, as 
they do for other institutions.  
This Article offers some suggestions for more structured inter-
institutional cooperation between the WTO and the WHO. It argues 
that discussion by trade and health policy makers, academics, and 
advocates of the suggested possibilities for cooperation would be a 
fruitful exercise for both trade and health.  
Ultimately, questions of inter-institutional arrangements between 
agencies with different mandates, values, and cultures are complex 
practical, political, and strategic ones237 that need to be carefully 
worked through. There are no perfect solutions, but there are 
opportunities to make a difference for the better. 
 
 
237. See John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem – Comments on 
Five Texts, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 118, 122 (2002) (―To flesh out the details of a 
landscape for making these power allocation decisions requires elaborate analysis 
and no-nonsense empirical studies, weighing not only the apparent or relevant 
needs for cooperation at an institutional level involving participation by many 
nations, but also the caliber and character of the available international institutions 
that might be used. Does a particular institution have the resources or effective 
participants, or fulfill the important democratic legitimacy criteria, or have the 
means to achieve cooperation between the players so as to be effective both in 
working towards its goals and in preserving or enhancing other important goals 
(such as reducing disputes, treating all kinds of societies fairly, enhancing the 
appropriate efficiency of markets, and granting national societies ―margins of 
appreciation?‖). 
